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NOTES
Proof of Scienter Necessary in a Private Suit
Under SEC Anti-Fraud Rule IOh-5
Of the vast amounts of statutory and quasi-statutory material
governing the securities business, the Securities and Exchange Commission's rule IOb-5 1 has potentially the greatest direct importance
to the largest number of people. While several provisions in the
government's regulatory scheme set more or less specific standards
of conduct for securities issuers, broker-dealers, or corporate insiders,
the anti-fraud provisions of rule I0b-5 apply to all persons directly
or indirectly connected with any sale or purchase of securities transacted through a facility of interstate commerce, the mails, or on a
national exchange. In its three clauses, rule 10b-5 forbids any person (I) to employ devices or schemes to defraud, (2) to misrepresent
a material fact or to omit a material fact which causes any statement
made to be misleading, or (3) to engage in any practice which would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person. Rule I 0b-5 was promulgated by the SEC under the authority of section IO(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 19342 in order to enable the Commission
to protect the market from fraud. 8 The rule assumed its broad significance, however, when the courts indicated a willingness to imply4
1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.IOb-5 (1964). Rule IOb-5 provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
,
"(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
"(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
"(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."
2. 48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) (1958):
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national exchange . • •
"(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors."
3. The SEC Release promulgating rule I0b-5 referred to it as a device to close
"a loophole in the protections against fraud administered by the Commission••• .''
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230, May 21, 1942.
4. The meaning of the term implied remedy is set out in this language of the
Supreme Court: "[D]isregard of the command of the statute [which does not specifically
create a civil remedy] is a wrongful act, and where it results in damage to one of the
class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover the
damages from the party in default is implied.•••"Texas&: Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241
U.S. 33, 39 (1916). See generally Note, Implying Civil Remedies From Federal Regu•
latory_ Stnt'#tf!s, 77 HARv. L. REv. 285 (1963).
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a private civil remedy in favor of both buyers and sellers injured
by its violation.15
When a purchaser of securities brings suit, this judicial initiative in implying a civil remedy poses a logical difficulty. Congress,
in section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933,6 expressly provided
the stock purchaser with a cause of action against a seller who had
misrepresented a material fact or omitted a material fact making his
statements misleading. In other words, section 12(2) specifically
affords civil relief for misconduct identical with that treated by
clause (2) of rule IOb-5, but section 12(2) is available only to a
securities p~rchaser. 7 Moreover, Congress placed significant statutory restrictions on the buyer's use of section 12(2), most notably a
short, one-year statute of limitations. 8 Given this detailed enunciation of a buyer's rights by Congress, reluctance by the judiciary to
imply another private remedy for buyers under section lO(b) and
rule 1Ob-5, particularly when the alleged fraud is expressly within
the ambit of section 12(2), is not surprising.9
This hesitation might have developed into intransigence had it
not been for the fact that Congress provided no cause of action for
sellers comparable to that created for purchasers by section 12(2).
5. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), which
is the leading case. See also notes 10, 14 and 51 infra and accompanying text.
6. Securities Act of 1933, § 12(2), 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2)
(1958) provides:
"Any person who •••
"(2) offers or sells a security ••• [except securities issued or guaranteed by the
United States or a state or political subdivision], by the use of any means
or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce
or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which
includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which .they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not
knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden
of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could
not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to the person
purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity
in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover .the consideration paid
for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no
longer owns the security." (Emphasis added.)
7. Section 12(2) would, of course, also allow the purchaser recovery on the basis of
the practices proscribed by clauses (1) and (3) of rule lOb-5 when ,they involve mis•
statements or omissions.
8. Suit must be brought within one year after discovery of the untrue statement
or omission and in no event more than three years after the date of sale. Securities
Act of 1933, § 13, 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1958). There are other
restrictions of less general impottance: State or municipal securities sales are exempted,
the plaintiff is limited to an action for rescission (as opposed to damages) if he still
owns the stock at the time of suit, -and suit may be brought only against ,the actual
seller or one who is a "controlling person" under § 15 of the Securities Act of 1933,
48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 770 (1958).
9. Several cases, decided in the late 1940's, denied buyers the advantages of the
implied remedy. See, e.g., Montague v. Electronic Corp. of America, 76 F. Supp. 933
(S.D.N.Y. 1948).
-

1072

Michigan Law Review

[Vol 6S

Thus, if a buyer's representations misled his seller, the latter could
only sue under state law. Courts sought a way to equalize the situation and found the solution by implying civil relief under rule
IOb-5 in favor of sellers.10 Doing so, however, gave the seller an
apparent edge over the buyer because a seller's implied remedy was
not encumbered by those restrictions surrounding a buyer's section
12(2) action. 11 Consequently, courts were faced with the alternative
of either confining the buyer's federally created rights to those set
out in section 12(2) with its restrictions, which is tantamount to
treating a buyer as a second-class fraud victim in comparison with
a seller, or else presuming that Congress did not intend section
12(2) to provide the purchaser's exclusive relief under federal law
and implying a less restricted remedy under rule 10b-5 in favor of
both buyers and sellers. 12
The recent case of Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd.18 is
representative of the growing number of decisions that have elected
the latter alternative, permitting a buyer's suit under rule IOb-5,
including a suit for alleged misstatements and omissions under
clause (2). 14 Plaintiffs were a number of individual purchasers seek10. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), is the first
case to permit a seller to sue under rule lOb-5.
11. See note 8 supra. The controlling statute of limitations on the implied remedy
under rule lOb-5 is ,that limitation period governing common-law suits of similar nature
in the state in which the federal district court sits, and the rule lOb-5 suit is usually
characterized as fraud. Invariably the state statute of limitations for fraud is longer
than the one-year limitation period on a § 12(2) action. See Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 775-76 (D. Colo. 1964); 3 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION
1771-78 (2d ed. 1961).
It should be noted, however, that although § 12(2) contains restrictions that are
not present in a suit under rule l0b-5, ~th § 12(2) and rule lOb-5 suits offer advantages over a common-law fraud action. First, omissions are actionable as long as
they are of a material nature. This is not always the case at common law. See generally
42 VA. L. R.Ev. 546-54 (1956). Second, special venue provisions and nationwide service
of process are available. Securities Act of 1933, § 22, 48 Stat. 86, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77v (1958); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 48 Stat. 902, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(1958).
12. See Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). A third possible alternative,
permitting only the seller to sue under rule lOb-5 but reading the restrictions on a
buyer's suit under § 12(2) into the seller's rule lOb-5 action, has never been adopted
by any court and has been criticized as requiring "too substantial a judicial rewriting
of the statutes.'' 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 11, at 1790.
13. 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964).
14. The leading case implying a buyer's action is Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co.,
188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951). The Fischman-Trussell line of cases has been criticized.
See 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 11, at 1778-97. Nevertheless, since Fischman no court
has seriously challenged the implication of a buyer's remedy from rule l0b-5.
Several courts have also implied a private remedy from § 17(a) of the Securities
Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1958). Dack v. Shanman,
227 F. Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
See Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., supra at 787 n.2. Section 17(a) contains language
virtually identical to that of rule l0b-5, except that § 17(a) governs only the conduct
of sellers. The court in Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D.
Colo. 1964), held that since the express civil remedy of § 12(2) was created by Congress'
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ing to recover from the seller-issuers. Some of the plaintiffs sought
rescission of the transaction and recovery of their purchase price
while others sought damages.111 Three counts in the complaint
charged defendants with various misrepresentations and omissions
in violation of rule lOb-5(2). Of these three, two counts failed to
allege specifically "fraud," "knowledge of falsity," or "intent to deceive" and were dismissed by the district court as insuffi.cient.16
Dismissal was necessary, the court ruled, if it were to justify
implying a remedy from rule lOb-5 when section 12(2) was already
reworking the wording of § 17(a)(2), it would be going too far to circumvent the
restrictions on § 12(2) by implying a remedy directly from § 17(a), apparently because
§§ 12(2) and 17(a) were part of the same piece of legislation. Id. at 768-69. Those cases
which do allow a buyer to sue under § 17(a) would treat it as interchangeable with
§ I0b-5 and the plaintiff's rights under either as identical. See Dack v. Shanman,
supra. The discussion in the text, although directed toward rule I0b-5, is, with one
exception, note 28 infra, applicable also to § 17(a).
15. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition of Motion for More Definite Statements, p. 4, Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., supra note 14. There is no
indication of the measure of damages sought. Following the majority rule for
computing damages in a fraud acti9n, plaintiff would be entitled to the difference
between the actual value of the stock and the value which the stock would have
had if the defendant's representations had been accurate. PROSSER, TORTS § 105, at 751
(3d ed. 1964). Thus, if plaintiff purchased stock for $5,000 (its then present market
value) on the basis of the defendant's statement that it would double in value within
two years when in fact it retained its initial value, plaintiff could recover $5,000. Under
the minority rule plaintiff would receive the difference between ·the amount he paid
and the value of what he received. Id. at 750. Applying this measure of damages to
the above situation, plaintiff would not be allowed any recovery. But cf. note 32 infra
and accompanying text.
16. The court summarized the two insufficient counts of the complaint:
"The affirmative misrepresentations alleged in paragraph four of the first claim
for relief are as follows:
"a. That the stock sold by the defendants to the plaintiffs was worth eight
dollars per share.
"b. That the price of the stock would go up in value in the near future.
"c. That the price of the stock would double in two years.
"d. That the price of the stock would go up to twelve dollars per share in
six months.
"e. That the sellers would be able to resell in the event the purchaser wanted
to trade.
"f. That a market for the stock existed.
"g. That the stock would be listed on a national securities exchange.
"h. That the company was a sure thing.
"i. That no one except one woman had ever asked for their money back, but if a
person wanted it back, he could get it back without expense."
"In paragraph four, then, the plaintiffs itemize the affirmative misstatements
and half-truths allegedly promulgated by defendants. In paragraph five the plaintiffs shift ground. There they allege neither affirmative misstatement nor intentional concealment; nor do they allege that sort of partial disclosure which would
amount to the promulgation of half-truths. They allege, rather, substantially
total nondisclosure ••••
"The fourth claim • • • [incorporates the allegations of the first claim but]
adds the further allegation that the defendants owed a legal duty to the plaintiffs to disclose full, complete and accurate information, that defendants negligently failed to perform that duty, and that as a proximate result of this alleged
breach of duty plaintiffs have been injured. As will later be seen, an allegation
of mere negligence does not, in our view, state a claim arising under § I0(b) on
which relief can be granted."
Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 760•62 (D. Colo. 1964).
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available to provide specific relief for the type of allegations set out
in plaintiffs' complaint.17 The language of section 12(2) allows the
defendant-seller to defeat recovery if he proves he neither knew
nor reasonably could have known the untruth or incompleteness
of his statement.18 This language incorporates the element of common-law fraud or deceit known as scienter19 into a section 12(2)
action, but as an affirmative defense. Therefore, reasoned the court,
the existence of both the section 12(2) express remedy and the rule
l0b-5 implied remedy could be reconciled by placing the burden of
proving scienter on the plaintiff when the suit is brought under the
latter provision. Thus, the two remedies would be distinguishable,
and, therefore, in the court's view, compatible without being repetitive because a prima fade action based on section 12(2) is subject
to a stringent limitation period but is not circumscribed by the
necessity of pleading fraud, while a suit under rule 10b-5 requires
the plaintiff to plead and prove scienter as part of his prima fade
case.
While the adoption in Trussell of an implied remedy for buyers
under rule lOb-5 to cover the same misconduct proscribed by section
12(2) seems to be settled law today,20 two defects in the court's
analysis are significant. The first lies in the fact that the opinion
suggests that there was an underlying theme of congressional intent
running throughout the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amplified by rule l0b-5, which justifies
implying relief from rule l0b-5 and indicates that the plaintiff must
plead and prove scienter as part of his case if his cause of action
depends upon this implied remedy. The court looked at the implied
remedy, with plaintiff bearing the burden on the scienter issue,
as fitting into a statutory scheme established by the express private
17. An early case refused relief under rule IOb-5 on the ground that:
"The settled rule of statutory construction is that, where there is a special
statutory provision affording a remedy for particular specific cases and where
there is also a general provision which is comprehensive enough to include what
is embraced in -the former, the special provision will prevail over the general
provision, and the latter will be held to apply only to such cases as are not within
the former."
Montague v. Electronic Corp. of America, 76 F. Supp. 933, 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
Cf. Missouri v. Ross, 299 U.S. 72, 76 (1936); 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCOON
§ 5204 (3d ed. 1943).
18. See note 6 supra.
19. The scienter element in a fraud or deceit action has traditionally been defined
by the courts as an intent to mislead, derived from the classic dictum in Derry v.
Peek, (1889] 14 App. Cas. 337. However, much confusion has attended this definition
because Derry v. Peek fails to suggest what burden of proof ,the plaintiff must carry
and postulates the alternative theories of recovery for a misrepresentation made
"(2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whethCIJ it be true or false."
Id. at 374. Neither of -these alternatives requires intent to deceive. The court in Trussell
seems to adopt a standard similar to the last of these tests. See note 43 infra. See
generally PROSSER, TORTS § 102, at 715-17 (3d ed. 1964).
20. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
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remedies created by the 1933 and 1934 Acts. This is an unsatisfactory rationale. The two acts were adopted primarily to establish
standards for securities sellers and to provide for administrative
maintenance of these standards.21 While each act does allow some
private relief,22 it is limited to violations of only a few of the many
regulatory provisions created by the legislation. Neither act evidences a design on the part of Congress that a defrauded party to
a stock transaction might recover only if scienter could be proved.
Furthermore, rule 10b-5 was adopted eight years after the passage
of the 1934 Act. Manifestly, the purpose of the rule was to regulate
conduct, not to create private remedies for injured buyers or
sellers.23 This regulatory evolution makes it highly improbable that
Congress, or the SEC, intended an implied private rule IOb-5 suit
and even more improbable that they intended the implication of
a scienter requirement as an element of the implied cause of action.
The second, and more serious, objection to the court's conclusion
stems from the fact that it is not clear from the language of rule
IOb-5 that scienter should be a necessary part of a plaintiff's case
when he seeks relief under this provision. It can easily be argued
that the words "defraud," "fraud," and "deceit," used in clauses
(1) and (3) of rule I0b-5, carry their common-law connotations and,
therefore, include the element of scienter.24 But the language of
clause (2), the provision most similar to section 12(2), in no way
suggests a requirement of scienter, defined either traditionally (defendant actually knew the falsity of his representations) or in the
more modern sense (defendant would or should have known the
21. Cf. note 3 supra and note 29 infra.
22. The following sections of the 1933 Act are the only ones that afford private
relief: § 11 (misstatement in prospectus or registration statement); § 12(1) (offer or
sale in violation of the basic prohibitions of § 5 of the act); § 12(2) (misrepresentation
or omission of material facts in an offer or sale). Two additional private causes of
action were created by the 1934 Act: § 9(e) (manipulation of the market price) and
§ 18 (misstatement in document filed with SEC). Three of the above provisions are
based on negligence, §§ 11, 12(1) and 12(2), while § 9 (e) requires proof of willful
conduct and § 18 speaks in terms of strict liability. In addition, § 29(b) of the 1934
Act permits rescission on the basis of a proven violation of any provision in the
1934 Act, and § 16(b) allows a corporation (or stockholders suing on its behalf) to
recover short-swing profits made by its officers or directors. The most apparent in·
dication that the ,two acts established no neat scheme is that after their passage the
seller still had no practical remedy by which he could recover on the basis of fraud.
But cf. note 52 infra.
23. See note 3 supra. The first successful private action maintained under rule IOb-5
was Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). To say that
Congress intended a private rule IOb-5 suit as part of a regulatory scheme requiring
proof of scienter when the buyer sues is to maintain that Congress, when it enacted
the Securities Exchange Act in 1934, foresaw the language of a rule issued eight
years later and also realized that the rule would become the basis for private relief
twelve years later.
24. But cf. cases cited notes 45 and 47 infra.
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falsity of his representations had he used due care of investigation).25
While the Trussell court recognized the interpretative problem
in connection with the language of rule I0b-5(2), the court propounded two other reasons, in addition to the need for conforming
with a congressional scheme of private relief, to buttress the
conclusion that the burden of proving scienter should be required of the plaintiff in a IOb-5 suit irrespective of whether
clause (2) literally so dictates. First, the court looked upon rule
IOb-5 as chiefly regulatory in purpose and concluded that a private
action should be implied only if the plaintiff proved the same type
of misconduct the government must show in a criminal prosecution.
Therefore, reasoned the court, since some quantum of mens rea is
normally essential to convict in a criminal case, its civil equivalent,
scienter, should be necessary in a private suit.26 The difficulty with
this logic is that the objective of rule 10b-5 is to prevent fraudulent
sales practices and, without any showing of intent to defraud, the
SEC can, under the rule, issue a cease-and-desist order, suspend or
revoke a broker-dealer's license, and seek an injunction to protect
the public.27 It seems reasonable, therefore, that by analogy a
private citizen should be able to prevent injury to himself without
showing scienter. Second, the court suggested that since rule 10b-5
was formulated under a statutory enabling provision which permits
the SEC to promulgate regulations to curtail any "manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance," the rule would be outside the
scope of the Commission's authority if some concept of scienter
were not implied.28 This interpretation of the enabling provision
is based solely on the court's reaction to the wording. The quoted
language may well connote intentional or knowing conduct, but
the legislative history of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, from
which it is taken, does not indicate such an implication was intended.29
Several cases appear to have taken the language of rule 10b-5
clause (2) at face value and seem to show a willingness to let a buyer
sue under this provision without pleading and proving scienter. One
25. See note 43 infra and accompanying text. Professor Loss suggests that sdenter
is not, strictly speaking, necessary to establish a violation of clause (2) but feels it
should be implied for purposes of a private suit. 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 11, at
1442 n.45, 1766.
26. Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 772 (D. Colo. 1964).
27. See, e.g., Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961); 3 Loss, op. dt. supra
note 11, at 1442 n.45, 1449 and cases cited.
28. Note 2 supra. This ultra vires argument would be inapplicable to § 17a, note 14
supra, since § 17(a) was enacted directly by Congress, rather than by authority of an
enabling provision.
29. The most meaningful legislative history of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
is in S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); S. Doc. No. 185, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1934) ; H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1934).
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opinion indicates that a plaintiff need only prove that a statement
upon which he relied was, in fact, false or that an omission was misleading.so However, the authorities cited to support this proposition
discussed requirements for a suit brought under section 12(2) and not
under rule IOb-5(2).s1 Moreover, plaintiff sought to recover his
purchase price. This relief is of some significance because in a suit
in equity many state courts grant rescission on the basis of any misrepresentation, regardless of whether scienter is shown.s2 The clearest example of a decision based on a literal reading of clause (2) is
Dack v. Shanman.ss In denying a motion to dismiss the complaint
for failure to state a claim in fraud or deceit the court held simply:
"It is sufficient to allege that defendant made an untrue statement
or omitted to state a material fact." However, this plaintiff also
sought only rescission. Dicta in a third case,34 one in which substantial damages were sought, may also support the proposition
that proof of scienter is not a requirement of the implied remedy.
However, the context suggests the court may have meant only that
a showing of scienter in the traditional sense of actual knowledge
of falsity (as opposed to a negligent lack of knowledge) is not required.sis
Of these two divergent views on the necessity of pleading and
proving scienter as an element of plaintiff's prima fade case in a
private suit under rule lOb-5(2), that adopted by Trussell is the
better, but for more compelling reasons than were set out in the
opinion. Rule l0b-5(2) must be construed in pari materia with three
30. Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14 (W.D.
Ky. 1960), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne,
307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962).
31. The authorities cited are Ouachita Indus., Inc. v. Willingham, 179 F. Supp. 493
(W.D. Ark. 1959); Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). See Texas
Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., supra note 30, at 23.
32. RES'rATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 476, comment b (1932). Although some of the
plaintiffs in the principal case sought only rescission, even as to them the counts that
did not incorporate an allegation of scienter were dismissed. The textual discussion
is premised on the belief that no distinction based on the type of relief sought should
be made in analyzing the scienter requirement. See note 39 infra.
33. '2.27 F. Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). This case arose under clause (2) of § 17(a)
of the Securities Act of 1933. The relationship between § 17(a) and rule 10b·5 is
discussed note 14 supra.
34. Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
35. Id. at 274. Defendant in this case presented the same argument the Trussell
court accepted as valid, that the words "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" used in § IO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 require that the
element of scienter be read into rule lOb-5(2) for purposes of a private suit. The
Ellis court replied, however, that if Congress meant for the SEC to formulate rules
directed at fraud only in the common-law sense it would probably have said so. See
note 19 supra; cf. note 4!1 infra.
Although other cases can be found which contain references to the scienter
problem, the question was not in issue before the court and it is doubtful whether
these comments are the products of thoughtful analysis. See, e.g., Kohler v. Kohler,
208 F. Supp. 808, 82!1 (E.D. Wis. 1962), affd, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 196!1).
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private actions of somewhat similar character expressly created by
Congress in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. Mention has already been made of section 12(2) of the
1933 Act. In addition, section 11 of the 1933 Act86 and section 18
of the 1934 Act37 provide a right of recovery for misrepresentations
of a special kind-those appearing in a registration statement (including the prospectus) or in any document filed with the SEC. The
characteristic common to these three provisions is that in each the
defendant may avoid liability if he can show due care and the
reasonableness of his statements. 38 Each of these sections establishes
a fault-oriented liability. The three provisions together form a
pattern with which the implied remedy of rule I 0b-5 should be as
consistent as possible. Thus, scienter should be an element of the
rule I0b-5 cause of action to make it fault-oriented also. This consistency is desirable not because of some logical scheme into which
the rule IOb-5 suit must fit, but rather because the judiciary, in
implying relief from rule IOb-5, should not render the expre~s but
limited relief of sections 11, 12(2), and 18 surplusage.39 This would
be the result if proof of scienter were not required in a I0b-5(2)
suit since, in most instances, the plaintiff would attempt to ground
his action under what would then constitute the strict liability of
rule I0b-5. Moreover, there are few situations where relief is available to a plaintiff by the terms of sections 11, 12(2), or 18 where
relief could not be as easily obtained under the private action
created from rule I0b-5(2).40 In addition, of course, any use of rule
IOb-5 as a substitute for section 11, 12(2), or 18 permits avoidance of
the one-year limitation period governing these provisions.41
The fact that rule I 0b-5 applies to any person connected with a
securities transaction also has an important bearing on the question
36. 48 Stat. 82, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1958).
37. 48 Stat. 897, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1958).
38. Under § 11 the defendant may prove that he actually did investigate and
still had reasonable grounds to believe the truth of his statement, and under § 18
he may show he acted in "good faith."
39. The standard should be the same whether the plaintiff seeks damages or
rescission, even though innocent misrepresentation may suffice in a state common-law
rescission case. See generally R.EsrATEMllNT, CoNTRAcrs § 476, comment b (1932). This
conclusion is necessary if the implied remedy is not seriously to reduce the value of
§ 12(2), because this section, although fault-oriented, limits relief to rescission if the
complainant still owns the stock. The Trossell court adopted a single standard for
all plaintiffs regardless of whether they sought damages or rescission. See note 32 supra.
40. Cf. Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Thiele v.
Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) • There are some situations where §§ 11 or
18 migHt afford a more attractive avenue of recovery than rule l0b-5. For instance,
under § 11, a corporation director may be strictly liable for misrepresentations in a
prospectus if he merely consents ito his name being used in it. A plaintiff may prefer
to rely on this provision rather than to attempt to show the defendant-director
"made" the statement within the meaning of rule IOb-5(2).
41. Securities Act of 1933, § 13, 84 Stat. 48, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §, 77m (1958);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 18, 48 Stat. 897, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1958).
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of whether scienter should be an element of the plaintiff's case in
a suit based on this provision. As indicated earlier, the common-law
concept of scienter has been expanded by the courts to include more
than actual knowledge of falsity. 42 The term has often come to mean
that, considering all the circumstances, and particularly that of
accessibility to the facts, the defendant did not act as would the
ordinarily prudent person to avoid misrepresentation, either express
or by omission.48 Requiring the plaintiff in a rule lOb-5(2) suit to
plead and prove scienter in this sense takes cognizance of the fact
that one securities seller may have less ability than another to give
his buyer an accurate picture regarding a particular purchase, and
it apportions liability accordingly. The investor who sells without
disclosing some matter of material significance, but which reasonable
investigation under his circumstances could not have uncovered,
should not be liable. This would not, however, be the result if the
language of rule lOb-5(2) were strictly construed so as to preclude
the necessity of proof of scienter as a part of the plaintiff's case. On
the other hand, the law establishes a higher standard of care for
persons closely associated with an issuing corporation and for those
who might be termed professionals in the securities business, such
as broker-dealers or investment counselors. These persons are viewed
as near-fiduciaries in relation to their customers.44 Increasingly, the
courts are holding that persons in the category of insiders or professionals are under an affirmative duty to investigate a company
before they make representations in an attempt to sell its shares.45
42. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
43. The problem of providing an exact definition of scienter is outside the scope
of this note. It is apparent, however, that negligence in the sense in which it is
used in the text often suffices. In United States v. Schaefer, 299 F.2d 625 (7th Cir.
1962), a criminal prosecution under § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, the defendant argued
that he had relied in good faith upon the information given him by others when
he made certain representations concerning stock to prospective purchasers. The
statements were in fact false. The court said: "This ignorance of facts is unavailing
as a defense 'where the defendant, by the exercise of due diligence, could have become
aware of his mistakes, especially where others may suffer a loss by his misstatements.' "
299 F.2d at 629. See Keeton, Fraud-The Necessity for an Intent To Deceive, 5
U.C.L.A.L. REY. 583 (1958). In light of these developments in the common law of
fraud, the court in Trussell used overly limiting language when it indicated "reckless
disregard" of the truth was the equivalent of scienter. 228 F. Supp. at 772.
44. See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186-92 (1963);
Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Charles Hughes&: Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d
434, 436-38 (2d Cir. 1943) , cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944). At times this higher
standard of care appears to approximate strict liability. Cf. Cady, Roberts &: Co.,
40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
45. Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963); Herring v. Hendison, 218 F. Supp.
419 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); SEC v. Chamberlain Associates, CCH Fm. SEC. L. REP. 1f 91228
(S.D.N.Y. May 16, 1963). An affirmative duty to investigate is imposed by statute upon
those responsible for drawing up a registration statement or prospectus. Securities
Act of 1933, § 11, 48 Stat. 82, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1958). The expanding concept of the professional securities seller's fiduciary duty to his clients as well as to
the market as a whole has been the subject of much commentary in recent months.
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Because of the imposition of this higher standard, a plaintiff-buyer
seeking to recover under rule I0b-5(2) from an insider or professional would find the scienter requirement, as defined above, a bar
to recovery only where the defendant acted in the utmost good faith.
Under this analysis, in a case such as Trussell where the defendant is an issuer, it would appear that the plaintiff has set out all that
is necessary to sustain his rule IOb-5(2) complaint against a motion
to dismiss when he has alleged (I) that misstatements or omissions
were made and (2) that the one making them was a person bound
by this fiduciary obligation and the corresponding duty of investigation. Under the more modem concept of scienter, a plaintiff need
not prove actual knowledge of falsity or intent to defraud; he need
show only facts evidencing negligence, which will vary according
to the circumstances of the particular defendant. In no case should
a complaint be dismissed as insufficient to state a claim for relief
merely because the plaintiff failed to include an incantatory word
like "knowingly" or "fraudulently" if negligence is apparent from
the facts alleged.46 When the defendant is an insider or professional,
a complaint which sets out that fact and charges the defendant with
untruths or half-truths should be sufficient with nothing more; the
duty imposed upon a professional or insider47 is such that misrepresentations attributable to a member of one of these classes
raises a presumption of a breach of that duty and establishes a
prima fade right of recovery. The Trussell court was correct in
holding that rule IOb-5(2) does not permit recovery without fault,
and in concluding that it is the plaintiff's burden to prove the fault.
The court failed, however, to take account of either the more liberal
See Cohen &: Rabin, Broker-Dealer Selling Practice Standards-The Importance of
Administrative Adjudication in Their Development, 29 LA.w &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 691,
702-14 (1964); Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62 MICH, L. REv. 607
(1964); Comment, Current Problems in Securities Regulation, 62 MICH. L. REv. 680,
730-43 (1964).
46. See notes 19 and 43 supra. Cf. Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir.
1944). Concerning the two counts found sufficient, the court stated:
"The second claim incorporates both the substantive allegations made in the
first claim [see note 16 supra] and the statement that the claim arises under
§ IO(b) and Rule IOb-5, but adds an allegation that the misleading statements
and half-truths promulgated by the defendants were promul~ted with full
knowledge of their falsity, with full knowledge they would be relied upon by the
plaintiffs, and that the plaintiffs did rely thereon •to their detriment. The second
claim ••• does state a claim arising under Rule IOb-5(2). The fifth claim incorporates both the substantive allegations made in the first claim and the state•
ment that the claim arises under § l0(b) and Rule l0b-5, but adds an allegation
that 'the acts of the plaintiffs [sic] complained of constituted a device, scheme
or artifice to defraud plaintiffs and further operated as a fraud or deceit upon
the plaintiffs in connection with purchase of the securities in question.' With
the addition of this allegation the fifth claim does state a claim arising under
Rule IOb-5(1) and (3).''
Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 762-63 (D. Colo. 1964).
The claims found sufficient are set out in note 16 supra. Claim three is not material
to this discussion. .
47. See Heft, Kahn &: Infante, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7020,
Feb. 11, 1963; Cady, Roberts 8: Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961); cases cited note 45 supra.
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test4 8 of what constitutes fault in a fraud action or of the higher
standards of fair-dealing which must be met by those in the defendants' position. Consequently, the court did not recognize the prima
facie pleading of fault in the facts alleged in the complaint before
it, and in dismissing two counts as insufficient, it misapplied its
own rule.

49

While this discussion has dealt primarily with buyers' suits
under clause (2) of rule lOb-5 because it has been in cases of this
kind that the question of proof of scienter has been in sharpest
focus, if proof of fault, albeit varying in quantity according to the
defendant's status, is an element of plaintiff's prima facie case in a
rule lOb-5(2) action, it should similarly be an element of claims
based upon clauses (1) and (3), which are expressly couched in terms
of "fraud" and "deceit." 50 Likewise, a seller should also have the same
burden of pleading and proof heretofore suggested for buyers. 51
While it is true that there are no express statutory provisions with
which a seller's remedy need be reconciled comparable to those
created for buyers by sections 11 and 12(2) of the 1933 Act,5 2 the
entire evolution of private recovery under rule lOb-5 was motivated
by the courts' desire to establish equality of treatment for both
buyers and sellers. 58

48. See note 16 supra. Cf. note 43 supra and accompanying text.
49. The correct result was thus probably reached in the three cases discussed
earlier in the text, supra notes 30, 33 and 34 and accompanying text, because in each
case the defendant was apparently a professional in the securities business. They were
critiized, however, because the courts seemingly imposed a strict liability on the
defendants.
50. See note I supra.
51. The most frequently cited case involving a seller's suit under rule lOb-5
emphasized the intentional character of defendant's omissions. Speed v. Transamerica,
88 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951). There are apparently no seller's-suit cases holding
that scienter is unnecessary for a rule 10b-5 action.
52. Section 18 of the 1934 Act, previously considered in conjunction with §§ 11
and 12(2), text accompanying notes 36-41 supra, is available to a seller as well as a
buyer. However, § 18 requires proof of reliance by plaintiff and, probably because of
the difficulty of this proof, use of § 18 has been negligible. See 3 Loss, Op. cit supra
note 11, at 1753. Therefore, if a seller were allowed to sue under rule lob-5 without
a showing of fault on the part of defendant he would certainly rely on this provision
in preference to § 18.
53. See Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).

